Retributive Emotions and Retributive Intuitions

Abstract

The article addresses a key challenge to moral justification in normative ethics — the relationship between emotions and retributive moral judgments. Retributivism holds that there are normative reasons to reward or punish individuals on the basis of merit, independent of consequences. A  common objection argues that such beliefs are grounded in retributive emotions, which are allegedly unreliable foundations for moral reasoning. The study aims to analyze and evaluate the  strength of this “argument from retributive emotions” in two of its main forms: evolutionary debunking arguments and moral rationalist objections. The research demonstrates that evolutionary debunking strategies, such as those developed by Joshua Greene and Isaac Wiegman, fail to undermine retributive intuitions, since anger is neither a necessary nor a unique basis for these judgments. Similarly, rationalist objections prove unconvincing, as moral reasoning is deeply intertwined with affective processes, as shown by the broader body of empirical work discussed by Shaun Nichols and others. The findings suggest that retributive intuitions cannot be dismissed solely because of their emotional foundation.