Affect “In Digital”: Cauterization Instead of Catharsis

Abstract

This article discusses, first, the ideas expressed by Konstantin Ocheretyany, which characterize the  crisis of contemporary commercialized emocracy. Second, I present my own version of the problem and its solution in the context of the philosophy of affects. It all looks as follows. Representations that replace things in the digital environment do not exert a direct affective impact. This deficit is compensated for by the representation itself and its tools. Classical affects are consequently flattened, as they merge reactive and active aspects. With the growth of the volume of representations and the prevalence of interfaces in practice, a contradiction arises between the pleasure of digital control over things and doubts about the reliability of such control. This contradiction is characterized by the emergence of a specific second-order affects, which is aimed at the state of classical affects, i.e., it tracks the reliability of representations of things based on our states. I call it zombie affect. The flattening of affects in the digital environment leads to their dysfunction in conventional applications. This situation can be described in Aristotelian terms of “pollution” and “catharsis” of the soul. But, as I demonstrate, catharsis as a renewal of functional capabilities does not occur. In the digital environment, problematic elements are instead cauterized. This leads to their re-objectification and semiotization, which eliminate the problem along with the symbolic relationships that caused it. I conclude that moderate anxiety is an integral component of digitally related affectations due to both the unreliability of representations of things and of the objectification of affective states.